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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
)
V.
)
EVAN DEAN ANDERSON,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)
STATE OF IDAHO,

NO. 46538-2018
ADA COUNTY NO. CR0l-18-11149
APPELLANT'S
REPLY BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Evan Anderson contends the district court abused its discretion when it imposed his
sentence - deciding not to place him on probation, in part, because, the district court felt, it
would be overly cumbersome to have him on probation in this case and on parole in another
case. That was not a relevant factor to the sentencing analysis, and was, in fact, mistaken on its
merits. The State makes several arguments in response, but does not actually address the core of
Mr. Anderson's argument. Moreover, several of the State's arguments are not consistent with
the applicable legal standards. As such, this Court should reject those arguments.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Anderson's Appellant's Brief

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by imposing and executing Mr. Anderson's
sentence in this case.

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing And Executing Mr. Anderson's Sentence
In This Case
The State proffers two procedural points in response to Mr. Anderson's argument on
appeal, neither of which are consistent with the applicable legal standards. First, its assertion
that there were entirely independent analyses in the district court's determination that probation
was improper in this case is contrary to the applicable legal standards. (See Resp. Br., pp.4-5.)
A sentencing decision is, fundamentally, based on the district court's assessment of the totality of
the circumstances relating to the defendant's character and the nature of his crime. See, e.g.,
State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8 (2015) ("In determining whether the sentencing court abused

its discretion, this Court reviews all the facts and circumstances of the case," examining whether
the sentence was excessive considering any view of those facts) (emphasis added); State v.
Mansfield, 97 Idaho 138, 139 n.1 (1975) ("Other considerations which the Supreme Court has

indicated should be take into account before sentencing and in determining whether to grant
probation are not are as follows: (1) all the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense of
which the defendant is convicted .... ") (internal quote omitted, emphasis added). As a result, if
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the district court includes an improper factor in its consideration of that totality, the whole
decision is tainted and should be vacated.

Compare State v. Schreiner, 2017 WL 361150

(Ct. App. 2017) ("However, where a trial judge considers an improper factor at sentencing, the
case should be remanded for a new sentencing."), citing State v. Camp, 107 Idaho 36, 40
(Ct. App. 1984) (Burnett, J., dissenting in part). 1
Here, the district court determined probation was not an option for Mr. Anderson, in part,
because of its mistaken belief that it would be cumbersome to place Mr. Anderson on probation
in this case, given that he would also be on parole in another case in that scenario. Since the
convenience in administering the supervision was not a proper factor for the district court to
consider within the totality of facts and circumstances surrounding the crime charged and the
defendant's character as they relate to the goals of sentencing, the whole determination of
whether Mr. Anderson was a viable candidate for probation is tainted. As such, there was no
independent basis for that decision. Therefore, the case should be remanded so that decision can
be made based on a consideration of the proper factors. See Van Kamen, 160 Idaho 534, 540
(2016) (noting that the district court could have reached the same decision in a proper way, but
because it had actually considered an improper factor, its decision to relinquish jurisdiction had
to be vacated for the abuse of discretion that actually occurred); Montgomery v. Montgomery,

1

Mr. Anderson recognizes that unpublished decisions do not constitute precedent, and he does
not cite Shreiner as authority for a particular decision in this case. Rather, he merely references
it as a historical example of how a learned court has addressed a case in which the district court
considered an improper factor in making its sentencing decision. Compare Staff of Idaho Real
Estate Comm 'n v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630, 634 (2001) (quoting Bourgeois v. Murphy, 119
Idaho 611, 617 ( 1991)) ("When this Court had cause to consider unpublished opinions from
other jurisdictions because an appellant had discussed the cases in his petition, we found the
presentation of the unpublished opinions as 'quite appropriat[ e].' Likewise, we find the hearing
officer's consideration of the unpublished opinion, not as binding precedent but as an example,
was appropriate.").
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147 Idaho 1, 6-7 (2009) (explaining that, where the district court's discretionary decision is
tainted by legal error, the appellate courts will simply note the error and remand the case so that
the district court can make the discretionary decision properly in the first instance).
Second, despite later acknowledging that Mr. Anderson had cited LC. § 19-2521 as
supporting his argument (Resp. Br., p.5), the State tries to procedurally default his appellate
argument on the basis that it does not cite legal precedent. (See Resp. Br., p.5 (citing State v.
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996).) Since the State acknowledged that Mr. Anderson actually

did cite legal precedent (the applicable statute) in support of his argument, its Zichko argument is
frivolous. That argument is also frivolous because Mr. Anderson cited at least seven cases which
discussed the scope of the sentencing considerations to demonstrate how the district court had
abused its discretion by considering a factor beyond the scope of sentencing considerations. (See
App. Br., pp.3-5.) Moreover, as discussed infra, his reliance on secondary source information to
support his argument was also proper, and so, that is yet another reason the State's Zichko
argument fails.

For any or all these reasons, this Court should reject the State's Zichko

argument. Finally, the State's Zichko argument is contrary to the applicable appellate rules,
which expressly provide, in cases like this where only the severity of the sentence is being
challenged, that the appellate briefs "need not contain ... citations to authorities." 2 I.AR. 35(i).
For any or all of these reasons, this Court should reject the State's Zichko argument.
As indicated above, Mr. Anderson relied on secondary source information in making his
argument, namely, information about the mission of the Department of Probation and Parole and
how it works to achieve that mission obtained from the Department's own website. The State
asserts that was somehow improper appellate argument because that information was not
2

Nevertheless, Mr. Anderson has, and will continue to, cite the relevant precedents, as they help
reveal how the district court abused its discretion in this case.
4

specifically argued to the district court. 3 (Resp. Br., p.5.) However, the Idaho Supreme Court
has made it clear that a party may present additional, relevant authorities in grooming its position
on an issue for appeal. State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, _ , 439 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019), reh 'g
denied; Ada County Highway Dist. v. Brooke View, Inc., 162 Idaho 138, 142 n.2 (2017).
Moreover, Idaho's courts routinely cite to websites which contain information relevant to
the issues on appeal, and have done so without any indication that the information was first
presented to the district court. See, e.g., State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 456 (2015) (using
information from the Death Penalty Information Center's website to reject one of the assertions
made on appeal); Fed'l Nat. Mortg. Ass'n v. Hafer, 158 Idaho 694, 696 n.2 (2015) (citing the
U.S. Treasury Department's website for information regarding the operation of the "HAMP"
program); State v. Hanson, 152 Idaho 314, 321 n.1 (2012) (citing to the National Center for
Biotechnology Information's website for insight as to what a diagnosis of dysthymia
encompassed); Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224, 227 (2009) (referring to the SANE Solution's
website to explain what that program entailed); Hyde v. Fisher, 146 Idaho 782, 789 n.2 (Ct. App.
2009) (referring to the Nevada Department of Correction's webpage for information about its
administrative regulations regarding Native American Religious Activities); see also State v.
Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410, 430 & n.10 (2012) (Horton, J., specially concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (using the Rotary Club as a contrasting example to the situation presented in
that case and referring to the Rotary Club's website as the basis for the information used in the
comparison).
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Notably, the State has not challenged the merits of Mr. Anderson's arguments based on that
information (see generally Resp. Br.), thereby effectively conceding that the district court was
mistaken regarding how the Department would supervise a person on probation in one case and
on parole in another.
5

In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court has used a website in essentially the same way that
Mr. Anderson did in this appeal - to show the underlying decision was based on a
misunderstanding of the relevant principles. See Smith v. Idaho Dep 't. of Labor, 148 Idaho 72
(2009). In Smith, one of the issues was whether the petitioner had timely served his notice of
appeal on the Industrial Commission. Id. at 73-74. The applicable rule provided that the date the
notice was mailed, as evidenced by the postmark, would be sufficient to make the notice timely.
Id.

The Industrial Commission found that the notice was timely served based on a private

postage meter mark on the envelope. Id. at 74. The Supreme Court rejected the Commission's
determination in that regard because, based on the Court's review of the United States Postal
Service's website and the information provided there regarding what constituted a "postmark," it
concluded the private postage meter mark was not the same as a postmark.

Id. at 74-75.

Mr. Anderson has relied on similar information here - information provided on the relevant
entity's website to demonstrate the lower body reached an erroneous conclusion in the case. As
such, the State's complaint about Mr. Anderson citing to the Probation and Parole Department's
website is not well taken.
Likewise, the State's arguments on the merits of this case are irrelevant and unpersuasive.
For example, it contends that, because the district court can consider the fact that the defendant
was on parole at the time of the offense, and that the parole board could have decided not to
continue Mr. Anderson on parole in the other case, the district court did nothing improper in this
case. (Resp. Br., p.6.) Those assertions miss the point at issue on this appeal entirely.
While the district court can certainly consider the fact that the defendant was on parole at
the time of the new offense and the parole board absolutely could have decided not to continue
Mr. Anderson on parole in the other case, the issue on appeal is focused on the district court's
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determination to not place Mr. Anderson on probation in this case (even though he had been on
parole at the time of the new offense) based on its understanding of what would happen if the
parole board chose to place Mr. Anderson back on parole in the other case. Therefore, the fact
that other decisions could have been made, as the State's argument notes, is wholly irrelevant to
whether the decision the district court actually made was an abuse of discretion. Compare Van
Komen, 160 Idaho at 540.

Since the State has not challenged the merits of Mr. Anderson's argument - that the
decision the district court actually made was based, in part, on its erroneous consideration of an
irrelevant factor, this Court should vacate that decision for the reasons discussed in the
Appellant's Brie£

CONCLUSION
Mr. Anderson respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 25 th day ofNovember, 2019.

Isl Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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